Downburst, forecast and blame: what separates the company that anticipates from the one that waits for the accident
A downburst is a well-documented meteorological phenomenon: air collapses downward from a convective thunderstorm, hits the ground with intense gusts, and spreads radially. It lasts minutes. It passes quickly. And with the right models, it is entirely predictable.
Picture this: a container fell from the top of a stack onto a truck passing underneath. It killed a person. It sounds drastic, exaggerated, but it is a real risk of port operations. The primary cause was a downburst.
We presented to the company’s director the ability to identify the probability of this type of event up to 6 hours in advance.
The response we heard: "...it wasn’t the wind’s fault. It was the fault of the person who was in the wrong place.”
There was no process. No alert. No decision protocol based on climate risk. But the blame fell on the person who was down there.
The cost of treating the predictable as unforeseen
Downbursts are not rare anomalies. They are descending air currents formed within convective storms, capable of generating gusts above 120 km/h in a localized area. Aviation learned to deal with them decades ago. Airports have wind shear detectors. Pilots are trained. The port sector is still in the “unforeseen” stage.
Nature study (2023): US$ 81 billion of global trade exposed to systemic risks from extreme climate events at ports. UNCTAD: 72% of port authorities have already been impacted. Half of the events led to total port closure, averaging 6 days.
In Brazil, 2024 recorded US$ 2.3 billion in demurrage (Bain/Valor). In Santos, 84% of ships were delayed, averaging 12 days. Climate is an operational variable, not force majeure.
Accidents also destroy years of credibility
On another occasion, we heard from the VP of operations of one of Mexico’s largest terminals: “...I don’t invest in climate resilience for efficiency. I invest because an accident can destroy everything we’ve built in credibility.”
He closes the terminal when in doubt. He prefers to stop for an hour and apologize later rather than operate at risk and deal with a fatality.
Same industry. Same risk. Different perception. The difference is not cultural. It is procedural.
Safety as a value, not a priority
Priorities change. Values are non-negotiable.
The first company has no process to question its own risk appetite. The decision falls on the person at the front line, without information, without protocol. When the accident happens, blame falls on the individual.
The second institutionalized safety as a value. It has a process that guides decision-making under operational pressure.
What it means to have a climate decision process:
1. Information with sufficient resolution. Public forecast = ~25 km. Downburst = km scale. Knowing “there will be a storm in the city” is not climate intelligence. It is what separates the company that waits from the one that anticipates.
2. Trigger protocol. The decision cannot depend on one person interpreting the data on the spot. The protocol exists beforehand.
3. Safety culture. If leadership does not support stopping when the protocol indicates, the process is dead letter.
The ROI of anticipation
Santos Brasil: from 7 to 3 days waiting (G1 2026).
Puerto Mejillones: US$ 305,000/year in benefits.
Complete climate security for all customers.
The question that remains
The downburst is predictable. The question is whether your company has a process to act before it becomes a fatality.
References
Nature Climate Change (2023) — Verschuur et al. “Systemic risks from climate-related disruptions at ports.” US$ 81 billion of global trade exposed annually to systemic risks from extreme climate events at ports.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-023-01754-w
UNCTAD (2018) — “Port Industry Survey on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation” (Research Paper No. 18, UNCTAD/SER.RP/2017/18/Rev.1). 72% of port authorities are impacted by extreme events, with 76% impact on operations, 60% delays, and 45% physical damage (p. 19).
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ser-rp-2017d18_en.pdf
Verschuur, J., Koks, E.E. & Hall, J.W. (2020) — “Port disruptions due to natural disasters: Insights into port and logistics resilience.” Transportation Research Part D. Analysis of 141 incidents at 74 ports in 12 countries: half of the events led to total port closure, with an average duration of 6 days.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1361920920305800
Bain & Company / Valor Econômico (Apr 2026) — US$ 2.3 billion in demurrage in Brazil in 2024, 15% increase over 2023.
https://valor.globo.com/publicacoes/especiais/revista-logistica/noticia/2026/04/10/instabilidade-geopolitica-e-gargalos-operacionais-afetam-custo-logistico-no-brasil.ghtml
G1 (Feb 2026) — “Climate intelligence prevents tragedies and reduces queues at the Port of Santos.” Santos Brasil / i4cast: waiting time from 7 to 3 days.
https://g1.globo.com/sp/santos-regiao/porto-mar/noticia/2026/02/18/inteligencia-climatica-evita-tragedias-e-reduz-filas-no-porto-de-santos-entenda.ghtml
Puerto Mejillones / i4sea — 426 climate alerts in Q1/2026, US$ 305,000/year in operational benefits.
https://i4sea.com/en/blog/el-nino-2026-latin-america-country-by-country-risks